CFPB Rule to Help Stay-At-Home Spouses Get Credit Cards

CFPBThe Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) has issued rules on The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act (“CARD Act”) to make it easier for stay-at-home spouses and partners to get credit cards by allowing card issuers to consider household income in their applications. The 2009 CARD Act requires that card issuers determine if a consumer is able to repay a debt before opening an account or increasing a limit. Until this new regulation, the issuer was only able to consider the individual applicant’s independent income. Card issuers have six months to comply with the new regulation. The CFPB’s press release is here.

Posted in CFPB | Tagged | Leave a comment

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/05/cfpb-rule-to-help-stay-at-home-spouses-get-credit-cards/trackback/

FTC Fines Telemarketer for TCPA Violations, Orders It to Cease Illegal Robocalls

robocallThe FTC has ordered the California company Skyy Consulting, Inc., which provides robocalling services to its clients as CallFire, to pay a $75,000 fine and stop all illegal telemarketing robocalls as part of a settlement between the parties. The Federal Trade Commission had charged Skyy Consulting with violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), by helping its clients place robocalls to consumers without their written consent.

The TSR does not prohibit calls that provide informational recorded messages, such as flight information, school delays, etc., nor does it apply to calls regarding the collection of a debt. Intended to stop unwanted sales and marketing calls, the rule also excludes calls from politicians, charities and banks among others.

As part of the settlement, CallFire must review all of its pre-recorded messages and terminate contracts with any clients it finds have violated the TSR.

Posted in FTC, TCPA | Leave a comment

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/05/ftc-fines-telemarketer-for-tcpa-violations-orders-it-to-cease-illegal-robocalls/trackback/

FTC, CFPB to Co-Host Roundtable on Data Integrity in Debt Collection

FTC LogoI will be attending a joint FTC-CFPB roundtable on data integrity in debt collection on June 6, at the FTC’s Satellite Building Conference Center in Washington, D.C. Consumer advocates, industry experts, regulators and more will attend the roundtable to discuss what information is available to collectors and how it is being used in the debt collection process. Panelists will also examine the verification of disputed debts under the FDCPA and FCRA; debt collection litigation and time-barred debts.

Posted in CFPB, FDCPA, FTC | Tagged , , | 1 Comment

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/05/ftc-cfpb-to-co-host-roundtable-on-data-integrity-in-debt-collection/trackback/

House Financial Services Committee Bars Cordray from Testifying

Is he or isn’t he the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau?CFPB

Richard Cordray is being barred from testifying before the House Financial Services Committee in the coming weeks until he is confirmed by the Senate because a federal appeals court ruling has put into question the validity of his appointment.

In January, a federal appeals court ruling held that President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board were unconstitutional and invalid.

And since President Obama gave Cordray a recess appointment in January 2012 to circumvent Senate opposition to the appointment, Committee Chairman Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-Tex.) is questioning the constitutionality of Cordray’s appointment.

Senate Republicans have refused to confirm Cordray’s appointment until Congress passes a law that would make the agency accountable to a bipartisan commission and to the Congressional appropriations process.

Unlike other regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the CFPB has complete autonomy. Instead of being subject to annual appropriations by Congress, it draws a check from the Federal Reserve Board, which is barred from interfering in its activities, and has no board oversight.

More on the subject is available at the House Financial Services Committee’s blog:

http://financialservices.house.gov/blog/?postid=330862

 

Posted in CFPB | Leave a comment

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/04/house-financial-services-committee-bars-cordray-from-testifying/trackback/

FDCPA Decision of the Day: Attorney’s Letterhead, Alone, Not a Threat to Sue

In today’s FDCPA Decision of the Day, a United States District Court for the District of New © SeanPavonePhoto - Fotolia.comJersey held that an attorney’s letterhead, standing alone, is not an implied threat of litigation.

The Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, claimed that the defendant, a Georgia law firm, violated section 1692e(5) of the FDCPA (prohibiting ”[a] threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken”) when it sent him a dunning letter. The basis for the claim was that the Georgia law firm could not file a lawsuit because none of its attorneys were licensed in New Jersey.

“It is well settled among District Courts that the mere sending of a letter by an attorney does not constitute a threat of litigation,” the court concluded in dismissing the complaint.

The decision is available below.

Download (PDF, 364KB)

Posted in FDCPA | Tagged , | 2 Comments

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/03/fdcpa-decision-of-the-day-attorneys-letterhead-alone-not-a-threat-to-sue/trackback/

CFPB Releases Annual FDCPA Report to Congress

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau today released its Annual Report to Congress on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).201303_cfpb_March_FDCPA_Report1

The Report outlines the consumer complaints received by the Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission relating to FDCPA practices, the Bureau’s efforts in supervising persons subject to the FDCPA, its enforcement, education and outreach efforts and its research and policy initiatives. A chapter is also devoted to the cooperative efforts of the Bureau and the FTC.

Technology has played a role in making debt collection more efficient and compliant, the Report found. At the same time, “abuses still exist and the industry remains a top source of consumer complaints.” But, “debt collectors who refrain from using unlawful debt collection practices should not be competitively disadvantaged.”

Although debt collection continues to receive the most complaints compared to other regulated industries, the Report found that the number of complaints made against third-party debt collectors fell 13.4 percent in “absolute terms” from 2011.

The most frequent complaints concerned allegations that debt collectors called persons “repeatedly or continuously,” but the number of these complaints were down 21 percent from 2011.

On its supervision, the Bureau reported that it will be evaluating “the quality of the entity’s compliance-management systems,” something I’ve been discussing in presentations over the past year. In addition, it plans to “review practices to ensure they comply with Federal consumer financial laws, and identify risks to consumers throughout the debt collection process.” What those “risks” may be should start to be seen this year. Collection practices with time-barred debt is likely one.

This nicely segues the Report into a review of its American Express enforcement action, which did include remedial action addressing the collection of time-barred debt.

Marx v. General Revenue is discussed in the advocacy section and the Report notes that the Bureau’s position was rejected by the Supreme Court. Read more about the Marx decision here.

Commentary by the FTC is also included in the Report. The FTC devoted some discussion to the Asset Acceptance Consent Order (which also addressed collecting on time-barred debt and you can read more about that here) and its letter closing its investigation into RJM Acquisitions (again, time-barred debt) which will be the subject of a forthcoming article on these pages.

The entire report is available below.

Download (PDF, 1.23MB)

Posted in CFPB, FDCPA, FTC | 3 Comments

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/03/cfpb-releases-annual-fdcpa-report-to-congress/trackback/

Are Significant Changes on the Horizon for Debt Sales?

Earlier this month, Reuters reported that several state attorneys general are engaged in a© olly - Fotolia.com coordinated investigation of the defaulted debt sales practices by some of the nation’s largest banks. Last fall, the American Banker reported that Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood was looking at JPMorgan Chase’s debt sales practices. The Federal Trade Commission released its study last month entitled The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry. And then there are  remarks recently delivered by Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“Bureau”), at the first meeting of its Consumer Advisory Board:

[A] creditor may decide to sell [a defaulted debt] to or contract with a debt collector to secure payment of what is still owed. Once this occurs, the paying business relationship has shifted; it now lies between the debt collector and the creditor, not the consumer and the creditor. 1 This can lead to mistreatment of the consumer, who becomes, in effect, a kind of “bystander” to the new business relationship. In this situation, creditors may have little reason to ensure that debt collectors treat consumers fairly and appropriately or that they maintain and use accurate information.

The state investigations, release of the FTC study and Director Cordray’s remarks may not be a coordinated effort, but they demonstrate that regulators are taking a hard look at debt sales. A fundamental change in the relationship between seller, purchaser and consumer might be near.

Let’s read the tea leaves dropped by Director Cordray in his remarks. Consumers choose their creditors, but if the consumer’s creditor sells the debt, the consumer has no choice in deciding the entity with whom she is now in a creditor-debtor relationship. The purchaser of the debt, according to the Director, may have no desire to treat the debtor 2 “fairly and appropriately.”

The result, the Director says, is a “dysfunctional dynamic,” in which the debtor is a “kind of ‘bystander’ to the new business relationship.” He added, “Without consumer choice, a key element of market discipline is lacking. The result is to permit or even facilitate a distinct indifference to the interests of individual consumers.”

The remarks suggest that consumers should be able to choose who collects their defaulted debt, or that creditors who sell defaulted debt should be accountable for the debt collection conduct of their purchasers. While either option is absurd, I do not believe they are simply theoretical musings. The Director went on to say:

At the Bureau, we are taking on this problem by highlighting troublesome practices and working to fix them. At the same time, we recognize that careful rules and effective oversight (through supervision and enforcement) are needed if we are going to correct the kinds of market failures that subordinate the interests of individual consumers. We are strongly committed to shouldering our important responsibility to protect consumers in these particular markets.

Will the Bureau “fix” defaulted debt sales? Will debtors be able to “veto” who collects their delinquent obligations? I doubt it. Will creditors who sell defaulted debt be accountable for the conduct of their purchasers? That could be where the Bureau is headed. The Bureau issued a bulletin last year advising its regulated entities they will be accountable for the acts of their “service providers,” that is, persons who provide a “material service . . . in connection with the offering or provision . . . of a consumer financial product or service.” 3 In many instances, this bulletin subverts traditional common-law theories of liability. But, so would holding a seller liable for the conduct of its purchaser. The “fix” may be coupled with regulations governing the sale of delinquent consumer debt.

The observations made by the Director, in my opinion, are equally applicable to the sale of  performing debt. Either way, such a rule would have immediate and long-term impacts. It would stop debt sales in the short-term, curtail them in the long-term and reduce the participants in that marketplace.

 

Notes:

  1. There is, of course, a contractual “paying” relationship between the debtor and the purchaser/debt-collector.
  2. The term “debtor” is used here because it accurately describes the person’s legal status in the relationship. The Director refers to the same persons as “consumers.”
  3. I discussed the Service Provider Bulletin last year in this article.
Posted in CFPB | 1 Comment

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/03/are-significant-changes-on-the-horizon-for-debt-sales/trackback/

FCRA Decision of the Day: Vartanian v. Portfolio Recovery Associates

Today’s  Decision of the Day is Vartanian v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) opinion from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.© SeanPavonePhoto - Fotolia.com

The opinion examines the FCRA’s conflicting preemption provisions,  § 1681t(b)(1)(F) and § 1681h(e), in the context of a claim arising from a person’s furnishing of information to a credit reporting agency. Section 1681t(b)(1)(F) can be read to preempt all state law claims, but at the same time others read § 1681h(e) as permitting state law claims based on willful or malicious conduct.

Congress amended the FCRA in 1996 by adding § 1681t(b)(1)(F) to preempt “any state laws that imposed any ‘requirement or prohibition’  on, among others . . .” the furnishing of information to a credit reporting agency. But the 1996 amendments left § 1681h(e) intact. Some have interpreted this to mean that § 1681t(b)(1)(f) only preempts state statutes but leaves state common law claims, like willful or malicious defamation, actionable.

The court held the 1996 amendment adding § 1681t(b)(1)(F) was intended to preempt any state law claims, both statutory and common law.  Noting that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) uses the phrase ”requirement or prohibition,” in explaining the scope of the preemption, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase to mean the preemption is broad, encompassing both statutory and common law claims.  If Congress intended to make the preemption encompass both state statutory and common law claims,

[t]o think that Congress clumsily left behind a Trojan horse that a litigant could employ to penetrate § 1681t and destroy FCRA’s delicately crafted preemption scheme is irrational.

It is a great, sound analysis and the holding is consistent with opinions from the United States District Courts in New Jersey and Massachusetts. Not all courts agree, and certain U.S. District courts still permit state law claims for defamation and libel for a person’s credit reporting.

Hat tip to our friends at Simmonds & Narita, LLP in San Francisco who handled the defense.

Download (PDF, 71KB)

Posted in FCRA | Tagged , | 3 Comments

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/03/fcra-decision-of-the-day-vartanian-v-portfolio-recovery-associates/trackback/

Law & Technology Friday: It’s Time for Service of Process via Social Media

Last year, I discussed here a court’s decision denying service of process by publication on © aey - Fotolia.comFacebook. A Texas legislator has introduced a bill proposing substituted service of process through social media. The Texas proposal makes very good sense because it provides more effective substituted service then courts regularly approve today.

Some have complained the proposal is flawed because it makes public (the existence of the lawsuit on Facebook or Twitter) what is a private matter. That is a mistaken belief. Lawsuits are public record  – you can search for them with the same browser you are using to read this article. And, as you’ll learn in a moment, legal notices are routinely published in newspapers. This “public exposure” argument against social media only underscores the tremendous publicity of social media and the decline of newsprint.

Others suggest you must “authenticate” that the social media account at which the notice is directed is actually that of the target defendant. I don’t share this concern — not in the least. The Texas bill is proposing substituted service. Substituted service is a manner of providing a person with notice of the pendency of a lawsuit only after personal service has failed. A party desiring to serve a defendant via Twitter will be required to demonstrate they have made a good faith effort at personal service, but the effort failed. Only then could counsel Tweet a divorce complaint.

The key concept of substituted service is to provide the best method to give actual notice of a lawsuit when personal service cannot be made. 1

In a New Jersey foreclosure action, for example, state court rules permit publishing notice of the lawsuit once in a “newspaper of general circulation” in the venue where the foreclosure is pending. A copy of the notice and the complaint are then mailed to the last known address where the defendant received mail.

This may have been effective 50 years ago, but in 2013 it is not the best method for actual notice of anything. Newspapers of “general circulation” are about as common as an eight-track cassette player. The papers that remain have anemic circulations. In New Jersey, the choice would be to publish in the state’s largest daily circulation paper (just over 300,000 readers) or the local daily, with a circulation of about 32,000. I would opt for the local paper because it costs a lot less and meets the “general circulation” test. With seven million state residents aged 18 and older, my legal notice reaches less than one-half of one percent (.0045) of the population. Most of that one-half of one percent, I will venture to say, do not read the legal notices section. Those who do are likely reading the obituaries too — which is to say, I might be reaching a dozen people. 2

Imagine your defendant has a Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn profile. They are posting, tweeting, or otherwise engaged in social media several times a day. Their social media profile includes a picture matching the description of the defendant and there are other indicia this is likely your guy. So you send him this notice — “@johndoe State of NJ to John Doe: you have been named as a Defendant in a lawsuit – more here: http://tinyurl.com/acrnqgl”. The link delivers the defendant to his summons and complaint and the message is well within Twitter’s 140 character limit.

If you still are not convinced this is a most effective way to notify a person of bad news, then  look at how Matthew Keys discovered he was indicted by a federal grand jury yesterday (which is a whole other story itself):

Matthew Keys tweets

 

 

 

 

 

 

As Keys said, he learned of his indictment “[f]rom Twitter.”  There is really no justification  to deny substituted service through social media when court rules still cling to legal notices published in newspapers having about as many “followers” as Keys does himself. 3

 

Notes:

  1. “[T]he correct standard to be applied would be ‘whether or not the form of substituted service . . . is reasonably calculated to give . . . actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.’” Blouin v. Dembitz, 489 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1973) citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 85 L. Ed. 278, 61 S. Ct. 339 (1940).
  2. Even if the notice were published in the largest paper, it is still reaching only one percent of New Jersey adults.
  3. Keys had more than 24,000 followers and had posted more than 68,000 tweets as of last night.
Posted in Social Media | Tagged | Leave a comment

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/03/law-technology-friday-its-time-for-service-of-process-via-social-media/trackback/

FDCPA Decision of the Day: Grant-Hall v. Cavalry Portfolio Services

In this March 6 decision from the U.S. District Court from the Northern District of Illinois, © Stuart Miles - Fotolia.comthe court enters judgment dismissing a putative class action, holding that an assignment of only the rights to collect and sue on a debt is sufficient for purposes of   §8(b) of the Illinois Collection Agency Act.  Hat tip to Katrina Christakis of Pilgrim Christakis LLP in Chicago.

Download (PDF, 122KB)

Posted in FDCPA | Tagged , | 2 Comments

Trackback URL for this post: http://consumerfsblog.com/2013/03/fdcpa-decision-of-the-day-grant-hall-v-cavalry-portfolio-services/trackback/